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In recent years, the development of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has led to many applications in the military 
domain.  Compared to the vast amount of research on RFID security, there is little research on RFID survivability. In this 
paper, we present a theoretical survivability impact model for military RFID. Due to a lack of military data, our research is 
entirely based on available public sources. The objective is to identify the critical factors that could significantly affect 
military RFID survivability and lay down groundwork for further research in this area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a generic term applied to any device used for wireless identification. Specifically, 
RFID appertains to standards such as ISO 18000-6 or IS0 18000-7 in that these standards were specifically designed for 
wireless, no line-of-sight identification. A typical RFID system is composed of tags, readers, and back-end subsystems (back-
ends for short). Tags are categorized as either active or passive. Active RFID tags rely on an onboard battery for operations. 
Passive RFID tags use the reader’s signal as a power source for communications. Active RFID has a longer range, faster read 
rate, and larger data storage capacity than passive RFID (Domdouzis, Kumar, and Anumba, 2007). The United States (US) 
military uses a combination of passive and active tags in its RFID systems. 
Although RFID security has received widespread attention from the research community, RFID survivability is a little 
researched area. Survivability refers to the ability of a system to provide critical services, which encompasses security and 
several other aspects (Yurcik, Doss, and Kruse, 2000). Sterbenz et al. describe survivability as the “capability of a system to 
fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of threats such as attacks or large-scale natural disasters.” (Sterbenz et 
al., 2010) The former definition offers detail on the components of survivability, while the latter focuses on the condition of 
survivability. The central concept of survivability is the system’s ability to provide essential services to users even when the 
system faces component failures and attacks.  Security is an important aspect of survivability, yet it does not ensure 
survivability by itself. The fact that a system has well-defined functions and correct implementations does not guarantee that 
the system is survivable. Some damages, which are resulted from novel, well-orchestrated malicious attacks, are simply 
beyond the abilities of most system developers to predict (Park and Chandramohan, 2004). In those situations, even a strong 
system with well-established security could possibly be compromised.  Zuo explains RFID security as the safety of a system 
and RFID survivability as the ability of a system to tolerate attacks and failures while still supporting the organization’s 
mission and delivering essential services to users (Zuo, 2010). Therefore, survivability encompasses security because a 
system severely damaged by attacks will not be able to provide essential services. 
In this paper, we study RFID survivability and the significant factors that affect survivability in the military domain. Unlike 
in other fields, non-survivability in military could lead to delay of troop deployments, loss of life, and even loss of a war.  
Since military often operates in a much more challenging environment, survivability of the essential systems is particularly 
important.  For instance, the US military relies extensively on RFID in the supply chain, which may be exposed to enemy 
threats. The US military uses Radio Frequency In-Transit Visibility (RF-ITV) in its supply chain to track over 35,000 
containers across 1,500 locations every day (Savi Technology, 2006). RF-ITV refers to a system that uses RFID tags 
combined with satellite communications and GPS to trace the identity, status and location of cargo from origin to destination. 
Non-survivability of RFID in military supply chains could severely affect strategic planning and critical military actions. 
RFID offers numerous benefits to the military. Examining the logistics of Operation Desert Storm shows the benefits of 
RFID. The US Department of Defense (DoD) shipped approximately 41,000 cargo containers over the course of Operation 
Desert Storm (Savi Technology, 2006). Of those containers, 28,000 had to be opened to determine the container’s contents. 
8,000 containers were not opened until the end of operations (Savi Technology, 2006). The Government Accountability 
Office determined that the logistical problems were due to a lack of visibility on the supply chain. The US military at the time 
was using a barcode system similar to the barcodes seen in grocery stores (Seigle, 2011). Had the Iraqis been more capable 
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opponents, logistics problems could have affected the outcome of Operation Desert Storm. At the very least, RFID systems 
show improvements in labor and cost compared to traditional barcode systems. 
Given the increasing importance of RFID in military, there is a lack of research in RFID survivability. In this paper, we 
bridge this gap by proposing a theoretical model to identify the key factors that affect RFID survivability. We formally define 
the concept of RFID survivability and elaborate each key factor that affects RFID survivability in the military domain.  Due 
to the difficulty in obtaining military data directly, we analyzed available public sources through a grounded theory approach. 
Since a military environment presents more challenges than a civilian environment, we were able to extrapolate information 
related to military RFID from information related to civilian RFID. Military RFID systems face all of the threats of a 
traditional civilian RFID system with the addition of several unique threats. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review relevant literature in the field of survivability. Next, we detail 
the applications of RFID in the US military. Then, we study the survivability of RFID systems by presenting an impact model 
and elaborate the critical factors that affect survivability. Finally, we conclude the paper. 
RELATED WORKS 
There is a plethora of research on system survivability in many other fields, which contrasts with the lack of research on 
RFID survivability. Knight, Stunk, and Sullivan classify survivability factors as environmental factors, service value factors, 
and operating factors (Knight, Strunk, and Sullivan, 2003).  They also recognize each information system as unique in that 
survivability is an aspect of the functionality requirements of a system. Ellison et al. identify the properties essential for a 
survivable system (Ellison, Fisher, Linger, Lipson, Longstaff, and Mead, 1999).  They define four properties as resistance to 
attacks, recognition of attacks and the extent of the damage, recovery of full and essential services after the attack, and 
adaptation and evolution to reduce effectiveness of future attacks. We elaborate on these properties in our research to identify 
the critical factors affecting military RFID survivability. 
The security aspect of survivability is a well-researched area. Current research identifies the flaws in RFID security (Juels, 
2006; Mitrokotsa, Rieback, and Tanenbaum, 2008) and still more research offers numerous solutions to the problems 
plaguing RFID security. The solutions include proxies, cipher systems for encrypting communications, and authentication 
protocols. Rieback, Crispo, and Tanenbaum propose a method known as RFID Guardian as a potential solution, which works 
by acting as a proxy between readers and tags (Rieback, Crispo, and Tanenbaum, 2005). As a mediation device, the proxy 
server broadcasts jamming signals to protect the tags.  Research identifies AES, RSA, and other traditional cipher systems as 
having potential for communications encryption, but it comes at a high cost due to the complexity of the circuitry involved 
(Toiruul and Lee, 2006). Variations on the Hopper-Blum protocol have been proposed as solutions to authenticating devices 
(Juels and Weis, 2005; Katz and Shin, 2010). Research also identifies elliptic curve cryptography (Lee, Sakiyama, Batina, 
and Verbauwhede, 2008), Ohkubo-Suzuki-Kinoshita protocol and its variations (Lim and Kwon, 2006), and numerous other 
unique protocols (Yang, Park, Lee, Ren, and Kim, 2005) as solutions to RFID’s security problems. Piramuthu analyzes and 
compares many of the previously mentioned security protocols (Piramuthu, 2007). While security is an important aspect of 
survivability, it does not guarantee a survivable system. Pal, Loyall, Schantz, Zinky, and Webber categorize survivability as 
survival by protection and survival by adaptation (Pal, Loyall, Schantz, Zinky, and Webber, 2000). The former refers to 
security and other preventative measures, while the latter refers to self-reconfiguration and adaptation to perceived threats 
after or during an attack. We consider both aspects when studying military RFID survivability in our research. 
Previous research into implementations of RFID has also revealed other shortcomings of RFID. Soon and Gutiérrez survey 
RFID adoption in New Zealand and identify reliability, compatibility, ease of use, and integration as challenges facing 
adopters of RFID (Soon and Gutiérrez, 2010). We will show that many of these challenges affect the survivability of military 
RFID systems. Previous research, though, fails to fully address all of the concerns facing RFID system survivability in a 
military domain. 
APPLICATIONS OF RFID IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
The US military applies RFID in several fields including the supply chain, asset management, maintenance, and healthcare. 
RFID plays a critical role in the acquisition, storage, distribution, disposition, and maintenance of military supplies. 
Technologies such as GPS and satellite communications provide additional support. When RFID is applied properly every 
aspect of the military benefits because the military relies on logistics. To better explain the threats, security, and functional 
features of an RFID system, we first present a generic architecture and discuss the components. Afterwards, we detail the US 
military applications of RFID. 
As shown in Figure 1, an RFID system includes the following major components: readers (interrogators), tags (transponders), 
a back-end system, and multiple networks connecting the various components together. Readers are devices used to query 
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information from tags. A tag consists of an antenna, memory, and a battery (active RFID only).  The back-end system is 
typically composed of two parts: a database for storing tag information and a front-end for displaying tag information to 
authorized users. In a military domain, multiple back-ends may be used redundantly for additional reliability. 
 
Figure 1. A Generic RFID System Architecture 
Supply Chain 
Supply chain is the most important RFID application in military. The US DoD uses RFID to track cargo from point of origin 
from a supplier to deployment in the battlefield through the use of checkpoints. The supply chain starts on the manufacturer 
side, with passive tags attached at the pallet and case level. The manufacturer then sends out an Advance Shipping Notice to 
the military via Wide Area Workflow, stating the contents of the shipment and the destination (US Department of Defense, 
2010). The supplies are then shipped out to distribution centers and depots. At the distribution center/depot, the cargo can be 
repacked into pallets or containers. Active tags are then attached to the pallet or container and the passive tags inside the 
container become associated with the active tag. The container/pallet is then shipped to a theater depot, where the cargo is 
taken out of the container/pallet and the active tags are removed. After this, the individual item cases can be delivered to 
soldiers. At various points along the supply chain, readers interrogate tags to provide checkpoint information. 
MIL-STD 129 guides US military RFID use in the supply chain (US Department of Defense, 2007). Military suppliers are 
required to attach passive tags to all individual cases, all cases packaged within a pallet, and all pallets. SEAVAN containers 
must use active tags and 463L pallets should have active tags if the pallet is not inside a SEAVAN container (US Department 
of Defense, 2007). All active tags comply with ISO 18000-7. All passive tags comply with the UHF Gen 2 EPC standard, 
which is closely related to ISO 18000-6c (US Department of Defense, 2010). The active tags in use by the military 
communicate on a frequency of 433.5 - 434.5 MHz, while the passive tags operate on frequencies between 860 MHz and 960 
MHz (EPCglobal, 2008).  
Newer RFID systems, such as the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) RF-ITV system integrate GPS and satellite 
communications with RFID tags.  GPS provides real-time item location, satellite communications provide real-time item 
status, and RFID provides real-time item identification and checkpoint information. RF-ITV is the military’s primary active 
RFID solution. With a combination of GPS, satellite communications, and RFID, RF-ITV becomes a complete item tracking 
system.  
Asset Management 
Asset management refers to using RFID to control and log access to items such as weapons or other important military 
equipment. Although it is a relatively new field, law enforcement agencies have already applied RFID for asset management. 
For instance, the UK police deployed RFID for keeping track of tasers (Swedberg, 2010). Tasers are stored in cabinets and 
are allocated only to authorized officers. The system maintains a database storing information on who used each weapon, the 
condition of the weapons, and how many times each officer uses a particular weapon. This system could also be used to keep 
track of guns and other weapons. With a system like this, weapon use can be tracked and accountability is achieved. 
Certainly, the military could deploy similar systems for better asset management. Actually, the US military explored this field 
by testing an RFID system used to log data on the rounds fired by the cannon of an M1 Abrams tank (Swedberg, 2006).  
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In conjunction with Sig Sauer, a US based weapons manufacturer, Visible Assets has developed a firearm management 
solution known as Firearm Visibility Network (August, Stevens, and Waterhouse, 2010). The system uses a RuBee, an RFID 
standard that differs from traditional RFID standards such as ISO 18000-6c and ISO 18000-7 in its network communications 
model, tag embedded in the handle of a weapon to store the number of shots fired, the date and time the weapon was last 
fired, and the maximum temperature the weapon was exposed to. Additional data is stored in the back-end database system. 
The system creates a report every time a weapon enters or leaves the armory. Southwest Solutions also offers an RFID 
weapons tracking solutions and ODIN, a Virginia based company, has developed a system known as EasyArms for managing 
weapons. With RFID, it is possible to know the details of every shot ever fired by a weapon. This information can be used to 
provide better maintenance and reliability for military weapons.  
Maintenance 
RFID also plays an important role in the maintenance field, notably with military aircraft. We have identified two 
applications of RFID in aircraft maintenance. First, RFID is used to track and manage tools associated with maintaining 
aircraft. Secondly, RFID is used to keep maintenance records of aircraft components. 
At Lockhead Martin’s Fort Worth facility, RFID is used for controlling access and logging tool usage (La Gray and Wright, 
2011). This ensures tools are not left inside aircraft. La Gray and Wright show the damage an inspection mirror made when it 
was left inside an F-16 (La Gray and Wright, 2011). Tool checkout and check-in occurs in an automatic fashion due to the 
nature of RFID. Given the fact that the Air Force is an important part of the US military, RFID systems can certainly play a 
critical role in military aircraft maintenance applications. 
In some newer aircraft, RFID tags are attached to short life cycle items to provide item specific data. This data is used to help 
service the plane. Airbus first integrated RFID into aircraft parts in 2008 on its A350 XWB (Costedio, 2011).  This company 
has plans to add RFID to other aircraft as well, including the A400M, a military transport aircraft. Other aircraft 
manufacturers were looking to integrate RFID as well. Boeing is currently testing a maintenance system that uses RFID tags 
(Perrett, 2011). It is considering using the system on military aircraft such as the P-8, C-17, and KC-46 (Perrett, 2011).  
Healthcare 
In the healthcare field, RFID integrates into traditional healthcare systems and has applications in the event of a crisis. The 
US Navy researched applying RFID in battlefield medicine with a test site at Fleet Hospital Three in Iraq, where RFID 
bracelets on patients were used for identification and treatment information (Yoshida, 2003). With RFID, the hospital is more 
likely to correctly identify patients and provide the correct treatment. Many medical errors can be prevented through correct 
patient identification. 
In a Mass Casualty Incident, medical personnel attach passive or active RFID tags to victims at the site of the incident. As 
victims are moved to safety, medical personnel enter relevant information into the tag. Ambulances use this information to 
prioritize patient pickup. After the patient is delivered to the hospital, his or her information is read into the back-end system. 
At the hospital, the tag can be used for identification, treatment, and medical information.  
SURVIVABILITY OF RFID 
To better represent the concept of survivability, we first formally describe the states of an RFID system in terms of 
survivability and show how the system could possibly transition from a survivable state to a non-survivable state. Then, we 
present an impact model of RFID survivability. Finally, we elaborate on the critical factors affecting RFID survivability. 
We define an RFID system as a tuple Ω = {R, T, B}, where R represents the set of readers {r1, r2,…, rx}; T represents the set 
of tags {t1, t2,…, ty}; and B represents the set of back-ends {b1, b2,…, bz}. All the possible states that the RFID system Ω 
could be are specified as a set S = {Si | Si ⊆ B ∪ R ∪ T}, where each state Si only contains the properly functioning devices 
(i.e., tags, readers, and back-ends).   The size of S is given by 2|B ∪ R ∪ T|.  We further subdivide Si as the union of three disjoint 
sets such that Si = SBi ∪ SRi ∪ STi, where SBi = {b | b ∈ B and b ∈ Si}; SRi = {r | r ∈ R and r ∈ Si}; and STi = {t | t ∈ T and t 
∈ Si}. The state of Ω (survivable or non-survivable) depends on two opposite factors: how fast the system components are 
compromised and how fast the compromised components can be recovered. A compromise causes a state transition due to 
attack or failure, while a recovery causes a state transition due to component recovery. Although an RFID system has a 
certain tolerance for non-functioning devices as well as self-repair capabilities, when the damage goes beyond a certain 
threshold, the system loses its ability to provide essential services and becomes non-survivable. When applied to our formal 
definition of survivability, the RFID system Ω is in a survivable state if and only if the following is true: 
α1
|SBi|
|B|   + α2
|SRi|
|R|   + α3
|STi|
|T|   ≥ β 
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where β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) is a threshold that represents the minimum requirement for the RFID system to tolerate faults and attacks 
while still providing critical services and α1, α2, α3 represent user defined weights to each of the three categories of devices 
(tags, readers, and back-ends) such that α1 + α2 + α3 = 1. 
The threshold can also be explained using visual models. Zuo, Pimple, and Lande develop such a model (see Figure 2) that 
defines survivability using compromises and recoveries (Zuo, Pimple, and Lande, 2009). The solid arrows represent 
compromises and the dashed arrows represent recoveries. This model provides the foundation for us to identify the critical 
factors that could transition an RFID system from a survivable state to a non-survivable state. 
 
Figure 2. System Survivability Transition Model 
In a real deployment, the transition model will have branches diverging from an initial state of all components working 
properly (S1 in Figure 2) and converging to a final state of no components working properly (Sn in Figure 2). The threshold is 
a line which runs jaggedly somewhere through the branches. To determine this threshold, the system designer must first 
know the critical components and the impact of each component on system functionality. The system would be non-
survivable if a significant portion of the critical components fail. From this information, the threshold and the weights of 
categories can be determined and a subsystem can be developed to check the status of the critical components. This 
subsystem offers a way of applying our model practically to determine the state of a system. 
RFID Survivability Impact Model 
Based on our analysis of military RFID applications and the system survivability transition model, we identify the following 
factors affecting RFID survivability in a military domain as shown in Figure 3. We discuss each factor in more detail in the 
following subsections.  
 
Figure 3. RFID Survivability Impact Model 
Adversarial Threats and RFID Security 
Adversarial threats to RFID have been widely studied. Threats come in many varieties and affect the system differently. This 
section looks at the threats that could affect military RFID survivability. 
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Although it is difficult for attackers to gain access to tags due to the physical security of military territory, cargo is vulnerable 
while in transit. Therefore, military RFID is subject to various threats posed by potential attackers. Mitrokotsa, Rieback, and 
Tanenbaum detail and classify the threats facing RFID as shown in Figure 4 (Mitrokotsa, Rieback, and Tanenbaum, 2008). 
The classification of the attacks is mainly based on the layer of the target. We briefly discuss the general threats and then 
focus on those that are particularly devastating to military applications. 
 
Figure 4. Classification of RFID Attacks 
Threats have different levels of scope and impact on an RFID system. Tag removal, tag destruction, KILL command, 
cloning, and replay attacks are capable of affecting survivability if performed on a grand scale. These attacks may also be 
used in escalation to perform other attacks. Other threats such as unauthorized tag reading, eavesdropping, and impersonation 
act as an important footprinting step for attackers to gain detailed information on the target RFID system. Threats such as 
espionage, social engineering, covert channels, and side channel attacks are challenging to mount; but these attacks can be 
used as a stepping-stone for other attacks or for information gathering.  For instance, espionage and social engineering threats 
can give attackers access to the back-ends or information about the system.   Espionage could circumvent military physical 
security.  Given enough access, spies can inflict copious damage to an RFID system, rending it non-survivable.  Denial of 
service and network protocol attacks can devastatingly affect the survivability of an RFID system. Attacker would have to 
gain access to the military’s network first; the reward for which would be significant. Cryptographic attacks are challenging 
due to the length of keys in modern cipher systems, but persistent attackers may succeed through brute force, side channels, 
weak cipher systems, or weak passwords. Tag modification, malicious code injection, and buffer overflows are the heavy 
hitters of attacks.  These threats have the capability to force an RFID system into a non-survivable state. 
Buffer overflows give attackers the ability to execute code on the back-end if successful. Buffer overflows exploit 
weaknesses in the middleware and are system dependent. Attackers have two potential methods to inject code into the back-
end system. An attacker can choose to inject code of a scripting language such as Perl or Javascript, or inject SQL statements. 
SQL injection is a significant threat because it has been proven in practice (Rieback, Crispo, and Tanenbaum, 2006). This 
attack works by storing SQL statements in an RFID tags data section. Attackers can inject small statements to shut down the 
server, delete or modify information, gain passwords, and even execute system commands.  These statements can be 
combined to create viruses or worms. Provided sufficient knowledge of the database structure and SQL tables, attackers stand 
a reasonable chance of successfully infecting the system using only a single RFID tag. Viruses stored in an RFID tag are 
capable of self-replication by inserting a copy of the virus’ code into the data section of a different tag in a table on the back-
end (Rieback et al., 2006). The virus could propagate to a large set of tags within communications range. The system would 
transition to a non-survivable state if the attacker can successfully pull off the attack because eventually the virus will 
overwrite many if not all of the tags. In the worst-case scenario all tags are overwritten, so |STi| = 0; therefore, if α3 > 1 – β, 
the system transitions to a non-survivable state.  
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Unfortunately, MIL-STD-129 does not include any provisions regarding authorization of tags or encryption of 
communications (US Department of Defense, 2011). This makes attacks easier because attackers already have access to 
RFID communications. They can eavesdrop, pass bogus data to readers, and perform more complicated attacks provided the 
attackers gain access to the target device. The lack of security in US military RFID opens the doorway for adversaries. 
RFID Component/Network Robustness 
Robustness refers to the ability of a system to cope with errors or anomalies in input. This is an essential factor of 
survivability because no system can guarantee 100% fault freeness. Robustness is more important in the military than other 
areas because part of the RFID system may be located in uncontrolled territory and exposed to enemy access. This 
accessibility allows enemies to mount attacks on the system; so, military RFID robustness is crucial to tolerate faults and 
increase system reliability. 
The US military’s layered approach to RFID in the supply chain provides implementation robustness. Active tags are 
attached to containers, while the individual components are passively tagged (US Department of Defense, 2011). Pallets and 
cases are tagged as well. The back-end associates all of the tags in a container together, so if one tag is read from a container 
the system can assume the other tags are present as well. The other tags act redundantly to cope with misreads. This system 
allows for many read errors while still providing accurate data.  
A robust system also has to cope with miscommunicated information. The layered approach of the US military prevents 
miscommunicated information from affecting the system in most cases. Exceptions can occur when the miscommunicating 
tag is not associated with other tags. This situation occurs more often in maintenance, asset management, and healthcare than 
in the supply chain. In these cases, the system relies on the back-end to correct the misinformation. This aspect of robustness 
depends on the creator to design the system to correctly identify and ameliorate misinformation. Adaptability, one of the 
properties of survivability identified by Ellison et al., plays a role in design robustness (Ellison et al., 1999). Adaptability 
relies on the creator to design the system to correctly identify attacks and modify itself to prevent further attacks.  
RFID Interoperability 
RFID interoperability refers to an RFID system’s ability to work dynamically and effectively with other systems. This 
determines the military’s ability to deploy RFID in new locations and thus the survivability of an RFID system.  
The US military has a set doctrine for RFID established in MIL-STD 129 (US Department of Defense, 2011). All military 
suppliers must comply with the standard. Therefore, the military’s RFID operational ability is restricted to countries where 
the RF spectrum allocation complies with the frequencies specified in MIL-STD 129. RFID systems are non-functional in a 
country where this condition cannot be satisfied, which preempts the issue of survivability. Lack of flexibility plays a role in 
interoperability since the military is incapable of adapting to different standards quickly. As an example of the time it takes 
the military to change standards, change 3 of MIL-STD-129P was finalized on 29 October 2004 while Change 4 was 
finalized roughly 3 years later on 19 September 2007 (US Department of Defense, 2011).  Due to the challenging 
environment during wartime, the military has limited time in deploying RFID facilities in battlefields. If the military were 
more flexible, it might be able to overcome interoperability issues by adapting to new standards as the situation demands. 
Pollution of the RF spectrum affects the operating environment of an RFID system. Pollution refers to both the fact that the 
RF spectrum is heavily allocated and that this heavy allocation can result in severe interference. Military RFID systems can 
be affected by interference from the polluted RF spectrum. The RF spectrum is used by many devices including AM and FM 
radio stations, communications, navigation, weather systems, CB radios, television broadcasting, air traffic control, Wi-Fi, 
cell phones, wireless USB, and even weapons such as Raytheon’s Active Denial System. With many different devices using 
different bandwidths within the RF spectrum, it is natural to expect that interference will occur. This interference contributes 
to the setup time because the facility must be adapted to block out the sources of interference. In rapid deployments, setup 
time can become an issue to survivability in environments of heavy interference because the facility might no longer be 
needed; a newer facility closer to the frontlines may make the old facility obsolete or unnecessary. In this case, the system is 
non-survivable because it did not deliver services in a timely manner. 
The US military may need the ability to deploy anywhere in the world. Therefore, RFID tags and readers must be capable of 
operating across the globe. Every country has the right to allocate the RF spectrum above it as the country sees fit, so it is 
difficult to find frequencies that are available around the world. An RFID system deployed in a country where the system’s 
frequency is not supported cannot function well and may fail in certain situations. The interference caused by other devices 
could cause reader/tag communication disruption and thus critical services may not be provided. 
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Functional Failure Recovery 
Recoverability refers to a system’s ability to effectively restore failed components in a timely fashion and this ability is 
crucial for survivability. RFID systems recover in different ways depending on the scenario and protocols in use. 
Recognizing the fact that not every failure can be fully recovered, we must prepare for the worst case when the system is not 
survivable due to devastating attacks. Table 1 in the Appendix shows various types of RFID failures and the recovery options 
available for each failure. Tag reprogramming is an effective way to recover from most tag failures. If the back-end is 
compromised, it can recover by loading a backup image of the back-end. Both of the previously mentioned recoveries depend 
on manual intervention or thoughtful system design. 
Using our system survivability transition model, we quantitatively define the recoverability of an RFID system. For an RFID 
system Ω, there exist a number of possible compromises for each type of attack. We represent the compromises for a given 
attack as the set C. For every compromise in C, a recovery may exist to counteract it. We represent these recoveries as the set 
Γ. The number of recoveries for a given attack depends on the system reparability, but in general |Γ| ≤ |C|. In an ideal system, 
|Γ| = |C|, which implies that every compromise is recoverable. We formally define the recoverability of a system for a given 
attack as ρ = |Γ|/|C|, which represents the fraction of recoverable compromises. ρ is unique for each attack because each 
attack has unique recovery options. In our future work, we will further the concept of recoverability by refining our 
quantitative system survivability transition model and incorporate factors specific to the military domain. 
CONCLUSION 
RFID has been applied in various military functions and will continue to play important roles in the future. Survivability is a 
crucial issue for the success of RFID; but is poorly understood and researched in military applications. In this paper, we 
classified current and potential uses of RFID by the US military. Based on our analysis of public sources, we developed an 
impact model to study the critical factors that affect RFID systems in military applications. We have identified adversarial 
threats and RFID security, RFID component/network robustness, RFID interoperability, and functional failure recovery as 
determining factors on RFID survivability. Those are the areas that existing and future RFID systems should focus on. In our 
future work, we plan to articulate a comprehensive set of attacks and survivability cases to validate the survivability impact 
factors we identified in this paper. 
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APPENDIX 
Failure Type Duration Affected devices Recovery options available 
Physical damage Permanent All N/A 
Environment 
interference 
Temporary All -Remove the source of interference 
-Move the reader to a location that is properly shielded from 
interference 
Active jamming Temporary All Same as above 
KILL command Permanent EPC Gen II class I 
tags 
The tag might be able to be reprogrammed 
DoS (Denial of 
Service) 
Temporary Readers -Destroy/deactivate the source of the DoS attack  
-Move the reader to a location that is properly shielded from 
interference  
Table 1. Comparison of RFID Failure Types 
